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Abstract— How does information regarding an adversary’s
intentions affect optimal system design? This paper addresses
this question in the context of graphical coordination games
where an adversary can indirectly influence the behavior of
agents by modifying their payoffs. We study a situation in
which a system operator must select a graph topology in
anticipation of the action of an unknown adversary. The
designer can limit her worst-case losses by playing a security
strategy, effectively planning for an adversary which intends
maximum harm. However, fine-grained information regarding
the adversary’s intention may help the system operator to fine-
tune the defenses and obtain better system performance. In
a simple model of adversarial behavior, this paper asks how
much a system operator can gain by fine-tuning a defense
for known adversarial intent. We find that if the adversary
is weak, a security strategy is approximately optimal for any
adversary type; however, for moderately-strong adversaries,
security strategies are far from optimal.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many engineered and social systems consist of a collection
of agents making decisions based on locally available infor-
mation. For example, a group of unmanned vehicles perform-
ing surveillance in a hostile area may use a distributed control
strategy due to communication constraints; social systems
are intrinsically distributed, as individuals make decisions
based on personal objectives and in response to the behavior
of friends and acquaintances. For example, the decision to
adopt a recently released technology may depend both on
the quality of the item itself and on friends’ choices [1].
In a multiagent system, whether engineered or social, an
adversary may be able to influence the behavior of individual
agents to indirectly influence the overall behavior of the
system. In principle, a defender can compute and deploy a
security strategy, which effectively plans for a maximally-
malicious adversary. Security strategies allow the defender
to guarantee a minimum level of system performance, but
as worst-case defenses, they may be suboptimal against a
real adversary. In this paper, we investigate the cost of
employing security strategies against poorly-characterized
adversaries, in particular studying how information regarding
an adversary’s intent and strength can be used to fine-tune
defensive measures.
A popular theoretical framework in this area is to model
the agents in a multiagent system as players in a game,
endow the players with a distributed learning algorithm (such
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as the well-studied log-linear learning rule [2], [3]), and
analyze the emergent behavior resulting when the agents
execute their algorithm. This has prompted much recent
interest the question: how can adversarial manipulation alter
the emergent behavior of distributed decisionmaking [4]–[7]?
Work in this area has characterized how an adversary’s ca-
pabilities and intelligence impacted their ability to influence
behavior [5], [6], as well as investigated simple questions of
defense [7].
In this paper, we ask how a system operator can leverage
information about an adversary’s goals (or intent) to select
an effective defensive posture. Here, we suppose that the
system operator must select a defensive posture without
knowing which type of adversary she will face. That is, a
central question of this paper is this: how should a system
operator implement effective defenses if the goals of the
adversary are unknown? Naturally, one option is that the
planner could adopt a pessimistic view and plan for the
worst-case adversary type; however, we demonstrate that
doing so can be quite costly in some circumstances.
We study two models of adversary intent:
• A malicious adversary wishes to harm the system op-
erator as much as possible, and
• An advertiser adversary has a vested interest in some
specific agent action.
We investigate the system operator’s defensive decision prob-
lem as affected by the adversary’s strength (measured by how
many friendly agents the adversary is able to influence) and
the adversary’s goals. We find that there are distinct regimes
of adversary strength: when the adversary is “weak” (only
able to influence a small set of agents), a security strategy
is nearly optimal. On the other hand, if the adversary is
moderately powerful, then security strategies are always far
from optimal, and can only garner a maximum of a fraction
of the total available welfare for an advertiser.
II. MODEL
A. Model of agent and adversarial behavior
To study adversarial influence we use the n-player graph-
ical coordination game [8]–[10]. The foundation of a graph-
ical coordination game is a simple two agent coordination
game [11], [12], where each agent must choose one of two
conventions, {x, y}, with payoffs depicted by the following
payoff matrix(1):
x y
x 1 + α, 1 + α 0, 0
y 0, 0 1, 1
(1)
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The game is played on undirected graph g = (N,E)
between agents N = {1, 2, 3, ..., n} using edge set E. Agent
i plays the two-player coordination game with agent j if
(i, j) ∈ E and i 6= j. We term α ∈ (0, 1] as the payoff gain
that ensures the x convention has an intrinsic coordination
benefit. An agent’s total payoff is the sum of payoffs it
receives in the two-player games played with its neighbors
Ni = {j ∈ N : (i, j) ∈ E}, i.e., for a joint action
a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A := {x, y}n, the utility function of
agent i is
Ui(a1, . . . , an) =
∑
j∈Ni
u(ai, aj)−
{
0 if ai = x
p if ai = y
, (2)
where u(·) is chosen according to payoff matrix (1). Here, the
parameter p ∈ (0, α) indicates that each agent experiences
some small personal cost for selecting the y convention. Joint
actions ~x := (x, x, . . . , x) and ~y := (y, y, . . . , y), where
either all players choose x or all players choose y, are Nash
equilibria of the game for any graph; other equilibria may
also exist depending on the structure of graph g.
Suppose agents in N interact according to the graphical
coordination game above, specified by the tuple (g, α, p).
The system operator’s objective is that the agents maximize
the system welfare, or the sum of nominal agent utilities:
W (a) =
∑
i∈N
Ui(a). (3)
An adversary seeks to influence the system’s emergent
behavior by modifying agent utility functions; the adversary
accomplishes this by selecting a set of agents and posing
as a neighbor whose action is fixed at y.1 Effectively, the
adversary spreads “impostor” agents throughout the network,
attaching each impostor to a specific friendly agent. We
write K = (ij)kj=1 to represent the adversary’s selection,
where ij denotes the index of the friendly agent connected
to adversary vertex j; we write K to denote the set of all
feasible adversary selections. That is, each impostor vertex
connects to one and only one friendly agent, but note that
we allow multiple impostor vertices to connect to a single
friendly agent. Agents’ utilities, U˜ : A×K → R, are now a
function of adversarial and friendly behavior, defined by:
U˜i(a,K) = Ui(a) +
∣∣ {j : ij ∈ K} ∣∣1ai=y. (4)
That is, in addition to the ordinary payoff from coordinating
with its neighbors, if an agent selects y, it receives an
additional payoff of 1 for each impostor node that it is
connected to.
Note that the payoffs in this game define an exact potential
game [13]. Given action profile a, let Ex(a) (Ey(a)) be the
set of edges connecting x-playing (y-playing) agents, and
let Ny(a) be the set of y-playing agents, and let NKy(a) be
1 Note that an adversary could play fixed action x as well, as considered
in [6], [7], and that situations exist in which a highly intelligent adversary
could influence users to select any arbitrary configuration of actions. For
this study, in order to focus on the specific questions of adversary intent,
we consider the case that the adversary impersonates only y-playing agents
and leave the more detailed study of x-playing adversaries to future work.
the number of total adversarial attacks that are successfully
converting an agent to y in a. Then it can be shown that the
game’s potential function is given by
Φ(a) = (1+α)|Ex(a)|+|Ey(a)|−pNy(a)+|NKy(a)|. (5)
B. Learning and Emergent Behavior
Now, suppose that agents in N update their actions over
time according to some stochastic process such as the well-
studied log-linear learning algorithm. Log-linear learning is
known to select a potential function maximizing state with
high probability in the long run; it is said that the potential
function maximizers of the game are the stochastically stable
states of log-linear learning. For reasons of space, we omit
the full details, which can be found in [5], [6], [14].
Accordingly, as we assume the agents are employing
log-linear learning and thus selecting potential-maximizing
states, Definition 1 gives our central solution concept:
Definition 1: Given adversarial influence K, α ∈ (0, 1],
and p ∈ (0, α), action profile a ∈ A is called an emergent
state with respect to K, written ae(g, α, p,K), if for each
component of graph g, all agents in that component are
selecting the same action2 (either x or y) and that action
maximizes the component’s potential function.
Suppose component c with mc edges and nc nodes is
being attacked by kc impostor nodes. Writing ac to denote
the action profile restricted to c, we can write the potential
function of this component as
Φc(ac, kc) =
{
mc +mcα if ac = ~x
mc − ncp+ kc if ac = ~y
(6)
Let k∗(c) be defined as the minimum k required such that
the emergent state of component c is weakly ~y.
k∗(c) = min{k | Φc(~y, k) ≥ Φc(~x, k)}. (7)
It can be shown that
k∗(c) = dmcα+ ncpe. (8)
In this paper, we consider two distinct types of adversary,
which we term advertiser A(k) and malicious M(k). An
advertiser adversary can be thought of as a promoter for
the y action (perhaps a marketing manager for a competing
product or a political rival), and arranges its attacks in an
attempt to maximize the number of agents selecting y in an
emergent state. That is, the advertiser desires to maximize
the objective function
UA(ae,K; g) =
∣∣{i : aei = y}∣∣. (9)
A malicious adversary desires to maximize the objective
function
UM(ae,K; g) = −
∑
i∈N
Ui(a
e), (10)
2 This requirement essentially reflects a situation in which the adversary,
upon allocating attacks to a graph component, randomizes the identities
of the nodes within that component which are being influenced at each
time instance, much like the “uniformly random” adversary type in [5]. For
reasons of space, we leave a detailed characterization of this interpretation
for future work.
equivalently minimizing the system’s total welfare.
In this paper, we study a situation in which the system
operator selects a network topology g in anticipation of an
adversary attack. Thus, we nominally have a Stackelberg
game in which the operator acts as leader and the adversary
acts as follower. For any network topology g, we assume
that the adversary plays a best response to g; for adversary
type T ∈ {A(k),M(k)}, we write
KT (g) = arg max
K∈K
UT (ae,K; g) (11)
to denote the adversary’s best response to g at an emergent
state (breaking ties in favor of the adversary). For conve-
nience, we write
W (g, T, α, p) ,W
(
ae
(
g, α, p,KT (g)
))
, (12)
or simply W (g, T ) when the dependence on α, p is clear. The
system operator’s nominal goal is to select a graph topology
g which maximizes (12). For adversary type T ∈ {A,M},
we write
g∗(T ) , arg max
g
W (g, T, α, p). (13)
For simplicity, we assume throughout that the system
contains exactly twice as many agents as graph edges;
writing m := |E|, we have that 2m = n. We note that
n > 2m leaves a quantity of nodes that a system designer
can never interact with. Conversely, for 2m < n the possible
edge topologies are a strict subset of the case when m = 2n.
We often utilize several specific graph topologies, defined as:
• SPARSE: A graph with exactly m 2-node components
and no isolated nodes.
• LINE: A graph with a single sparse giant component
described by a line graph containing m+ 1 nodes; this
graph contains m− 1 isolated nodes.
• COMPLETE: A graph with a single dense giant com-
ponent described graph containing all edges and the
minimum-possible number of nodes.
In this paper, we study decision making in the face of
strategic uncertainty; accordingly, we ask the following: if
the system operator is uncertain about the adversary’s goal
(i.e., type), how should she select graph topology? To begin
to address this question in the context of network design
for graphical coordination games, in this paper we study the
cost of mischaracterizing the adversary type for a variety of
situations. That is, for T, T ′ ∈ {A(k),M(k)}, we define the
relative regret associated with type T as
R(T ) =
W (g∗(T ′), T ′, α, p)−W (g∗(T ), T ′, α, p)
W (g∗(T ), T ′, α, p)
, (14)
which captures the fraction of welfare that is lost by planning
for type T when the actual realized adversary type is T ′.
III. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
We begin with a result which expresses a threshold on
k below which the operator can guarantee a completely-
coordinated graph. For adversary type T ∈ {M,A}, we
define kmax(T (k)) as the largest value of k below which the
operator has a graph g such that ae(g, α, p,KT (g)) is fully
coordinated on x actions. That is, if k < kmax(T ), then the
operator can be sure that a strategic adversary of type T will
not cause any coordination on y in any emergent state, even
if isolated nodes are playing y. Note that the operator always
prefers to avoid y coordination if possible (see Lemma 3).
In the following, d is defined to be the minimum integer
that satisfies m ≤ (d2). We introduce the following technical
definition:
Definition 2: A triple (m,α, p) is said to be ordinary
if there exists some graph g = (N,E) such that every
component c in g satisfies nc < k∗(c).
Theorem 1: We find kmax(·) for malicious adversary M
and advertiser adversary A.
kmax(M) = dmα+mp+ pe,
kmax(A)=
{
2m− 2d+dmα+ dpe if (m,α, p) is ordinary
kmax(M) otherwise.
The proof of Theorem 1 appears in the Appendix.
Next, we show that when k < kmax(M) (as reported
above), the cost of conservatism is low; the optimal defense
against a worst-case malicious adversary is asymptotically
optimal against an advertiser adversary as well.
Theorem 2: For any feasible m,α, p, when k <
kmax(M), it holds that when playing against a malicious
adversary, the LINE graph garners within 2p of optimal
welfare. Furthermore, it holds that
R(M) = O (1/√m) . (15)
Proof: Note that all supporting lemmas appear in the
Appendix. The first result of the Theorem comes directly
from Lemma 4.
We begin deriving the second result by seeking an upper
bound on R(M) for k < kmax(M). We present lower bound
on W (g∗(M(k)), A(k)) as
W (g∗(M(k)), A(k)) ≥W (g∗(M(k)),M(k))
≥W (LINE,M(k)) = W (LINE, A(k)).
Note the last equality holds as kmax(M) was derived in
Theorem 1 via a LINE graph, thus leaving any adversary with
trivial choices while k < kmax(M). This allows Lemma 2
to directly apply to the numerator of R(M) producing upper
bound
R(M) ≤ O(
√
m)
W (LINE,M(k))
.
When k < kmax(M) it can be observed that
W (LINE,M(k)) = 2m+2mα−p∗min{k,m−1} = Ω(m).
Thus
R(M) = O
(
1√
m
)
(16)
as desired.
Theorem 3: When k ∈ [kmax(M), kmax(A)], we have
that the maximum achievable welfare in the presence of an
advertiser is significantly higher than that available in the
Fig. 1. We demonstrate that kmax(M) = 117 and kmax(A) =
183, realized by LINE and COMPLETE respectively, serve as important
breakpoints in optimal decision making. In this case α+2p > 2, so SPARSE
dominates for either adversary after their respective kmax value.
presence of a malicious adversary:
W (g∗(A), A(k))−W (g∗(M)),M(k)≥
⌊
k
3
⌋
(2α+ 2p)− kp.
(17)
Proof: Note that all supporting Lemmas appear in full
in the Appendix. To compute a lower bound on (17) we seek
a lower bound on
W (g∗(A), A(k)) ≥W (COMPLETE,A(k))
≥ 2m+ 2mα− kp,
and Lemma 1 gives us
W (g∗(M(k),M)) ≤ 2m(1 + α)− bk/3c (2α+ 2p).
Calculating (17) we get
2m+ 2mα− kp− (2m+ 2mα− bk/3c (2α+ 2p))
= bk/3c (2α+ 2p)− kp.
IV. SIMPLIFIED EXAMPLE
In this section we will restrict the system planner to choos-
ing between the three canonical graph designs, SPARSE,
COMPLETE, and LINE. In this environment we completely
characterize optimal decision making.
A. Advertiser Characterization
We may observe Theorem 1’s kmax values were realized
using LINE and COMPLETE graphs and Lemma 3 provides
meaning for the kmax regions as relatively high welfare
zones. So if k < kmax(M) we may readily play LINE. Now
using kr from the proof of Lemma 1 we observe two cases
on α, p. They are α+ 2p > 2 which leads to
g∗(A(K)) =

LINE k < kmax(M)
COMPLETE kmax(M) ≤ k < kmax(A)
SPARSE else
(18)
or alternatively α+ 2p ≤ 2
g∗(A(K)) =
{
LINE k < kmax(M)
COMPLETE kmax(M) ≤ k.
(19)
Fig. 2. In addition to using kmax for optimal decision making, we must
compute a kint representing the intersection between SPARSE and LINE
because α+ 2p ≤ 2.
B. Malicious Characterization
We once again are able to readily play LINE if k <
kmax(M) by similar arguments. However once k exceeds
kmax(M) we must chose between potentially all 3 graphs.
It can be shown that kr(COMPLETE) ≥ kr(LINE)
and by linear arguments COMPLETE will at least weakly
dominant LINE for all k ≥ kmax(M). Thus we will define
kint as the intersection between SPARSE and COMPLETE
and use it as decision point between the two.
For our first case where α+ 2p > 2 we find
g∗(A(M)) =
{
LINE k < kmax(M)
SPARSE kmax(M) ≥ k.
(20)
If α + 2p ≤ 2 we simply use kint as a break point where
SPARSE switches to COMPLETE.
g∗(A(M)) =

LINE k < kmax(M)
SPARSE kmax(M) ≤ k < kint
COMPLETE kint ≤ k.
(21)
We showcase the results with sample parameters for α+2p >
2 in Figure 1 and α+ 2p ≤ 2 in Figure 2.
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APPENDIX
A. Notation
For component c in some graph we define ∆W (c) :=
2mcα + ncp as the loss in welfare when component c
switches from being stable on x to y.
We define several sets
• C(g) = {c1, c2, c3, . . . , cn} such that ci ∈ C(g) is a
component in graph g
• Ce(g) = {c1, c2, c3, . . . , cn} such that ci ∈ Ce(g) is an
edged component in graph g
• Cl(g) = {c1, c2, c3, . . . , cn} such that ci ∈ Cl(g) is a
node with degree 0
• Cx(g|T (k)) = {c1, c2, c3, . . . , cn} such that ci ∈
Cx(g | T (k)) is a component with emergent state ~x
• Cy(g|T (k)) = {c1, c2, c3, . . . , cn} such that ci ∈ Cy(g |
T (k)) is a component with emergent state ~y.
We use
W (g, T (K)) = 2m+ 2mα−
∑
c∈Cy(g,A(k))
∆W (c) (22)
as a convenient way to denote system welfare given topology
and the adversary.
We term some component c advertiser resistant if c
satisfies nc < k∗(c).
B. Proof of Theorem 1
First we derive kmax(M). Let g be an arbitrary graph
and q ∈ arg minc∈Ce(g) k∗(c). Lemma 3 gives the malicious
adversary strictly prefers Cy(g|M(k)) ⊆ Ce(g). Therefore
we can simply seek to design q to maximize k∗(q). First,
kmax(M) = max
nq,mq
dmqα+ nqpe = dmα+ (m+ 1)pe (23)
simply by problem parameters. Now we seek kmax(A).
We begin with the case where in the triple (m,α, p) is
not ordinary. This implies all graphs contain a nonempty
set S of non advertiser resistant components and we take
c = arg mins∈S k
∗(s). Thus at k = k∗(c), nc ≥ k and
intuitively the advertiser may weakly improve Ua by taking
component c over lone nodes. This behavior is similar to the
malicious adversary and we conclude kmax(A) = kmax(M)
in this case.
For brevity we present an outline of the case where
(m,α, p) is ordinary.
• Given (m,α, p) is ordinary, let all components in graph
g be advertiser resistant
• If there are plentiful lone nodes, advertiser resistance
gives the advertiser prefers to attack the lone nodes.
• Once all lone nodes are stable on y the advertiser may
gather excess attacks to make up the difference in Ua(·)
that occurs taking some non-trivial component.
• It can be shown that the minimal k where this happens
may be weakly increased by removing two components
in g and creating a new component with fewer nodes.
• We finish optimizing the graph with a single non-trivial
component by making making it as near complete as
possible.
Lemma 1: We introduce an upper bound of
W (g∗(M),M) ≤ 2m(1 + α)−
⌊
k
3
⌋
(2α+ 2p)
for k ∈ [kmax(M), kmax(A)).
Proof: Observe the cost to take every component in the
graph is given by
kr(g) =
∑
c∈C(g)
k∗(c) (24)
Noting maxα,p(k∗(c)) = nc +mc and∑
c∈C(g)
mc = m &
∑
c∈C
nc = 2m (25)
by problem parameters we may obtain maxα,p,g kr(g) = 3m
across all possible graphs.
Now we examine a SPARSE design with α+ 2p > 2. We
compute k∗(c) = dα + 2pe = 3 for ∀c ∈ Ce(SPARSE) so
we obtain kr(SPARSE) = 3m.
Let g′ be some graph such that g′ 6= SPARSE. Cl(g′)
must then be nonempty and by Theorem 1 we know for
∃c ∈ Ce(g′) such that c ∈ Cy(g). Thus g′ features two
unique ∆W (c)k∗(c) for c ∈ Cl(g′) and c ∈ Ce(g′). By Lemma 3
we know ∆W (s)k∗(s) > k
∗(c)p for s ∈ Ce(SPARSE).
Knowing W (g′,M(0)) = W (SPARSE,M(0)) and
W (g′,M(3m)) = W (SPARSE,M(3m)), we deduce
then that W (c)k∗(c) >
W (s)
k∗(s) for c ∈ Ce(g′). Thus
W (SPARSE,M(k)) ≥W (g′,M(k)) for k ≥ kmax(M) &
∀g′, thus making SPARSE optimal.
Now we define SPARSE∗ to be a fictional graph iden-
tical with SPARSE except it satisfies k∗(c) = 3 for c ∈
Ce(SPARSE
∗) for all α, p. So kr(SPARSE∗) = 3m and
we may then follow similar arguments that kr(g′) is max-
imally 3m and g′ must contain some component satisfying
W (c)
k∗(c) >
W (s)
k∗(s) for c ∈ Ce(g′), s ∈ Ce(SPARSE∗). Thus
W (SPARSE∗,M) ≥ W (g′,M) by the same arguments as
sparse ∀g′, α, p.
So we may present the welfare function of SPARSE∗ as
W (g∗(M),M(k)) ≤ 2m(1 + α)− bk/3c (2α+ 2p). (26)
Lemma 2: When k < kmax(M), the welfare benefit of
g∗(A(k)) over LINE is O(√m):
B(k) ,W (g∗(A), A(k))−W (LINE, A(k)) = O(√m)
(27)
Proof: First we may appreciate the implications of
Lemma 3 such that any candidate optimal graph g must
satisfy Ce(g) ∩ Cy(g|A(k)) = ∅.
And by Theorem 1’s kmax values were obtained via single
nontrivial component graphs. However even the most sparse
of these designs, the line graph, leaves (m − 1) nodes
unconnected. That is,
W (LINE, A(k)) = 2m(1 + α)− pmin{k,m− 1}, (28)
So if we can satisfy the first requirement with a many-tree
component graph, we could increase welfare.
Observe that any tree component will cover mc + 1
nodes and any component with at least one cycle will cover
strictly less. Therefore we can let nc = mc + 1. Note that∑
c∈Ce(g)mc+1 = m+ |Ce(g)| thus forest graph g contains|Cl(g)| − |Cl(LINE)| = |Ce(g)| − 1 less lone nodes. Thus,
an optimal graph g in this regime is composed entirely of
tree components and lose none to an advertiser. That is, it
holds that
W (g,A(k)) ≤ 2m(1+α)−pmin{k,m−1}+p(|Ce(g)|−1).
(29)
This is due to the fact that each additional component
protects at most one additional node, potentially improving
welfare relative to (28) by an amount p for some k. Com-
bining (28) and (29), we obtain upper bound.
B(k) ≤ (|Ce(g)| − 1)p. (30)
Consider a situation such that forest graph g∗ has |Ce(g∗)|
non trivial components and m − |Ce(g∗)| lone nodes. Let
c ∈ arg minq∈Ce(g∗) k∗(q). When m− |Ce(g∗)| < k < m−|Ce(g∗)|+dmcα+ncpe, suppose the advertiser takes all lone
nodes but no component. Then we have
B(k) = 2m(1 + α)− (m− |Ce(g∗)|)p− (2m(1 + α)− kp)
≤ (m− |Ce(g∗)|+ dmcα+ ncpe −m+ |Ce(g∗)|)p
= dmcα+ ncpep. (31)
Combining (30) and (31) and noting g∗ is a forest, we
have
B(k) ≤ p ·min{(|Ce(g∗)| − 1), dmc(α+ p) + pe}. (32)
Recall that |Ce(g∗)| ≤ b mmc c. Then if mc >
√
m,
|Ce| ≤ bm/mcc ≤
⌊
m/
√
m
⌋
= b√mc. (33)
That is, either mc ≤
√
m or |Ce(g∗)| ≤
√
m. Thus it is clear
from (32) that
B(k) = O(√m)
as desired.
Lemma 3: If c ∈ Ce(g) and c′ ∈ Cl(g) then ∆W (c)k∗(c) >
∆W (c′)
k∗(c′) or equivalently ∆W (c) > k
∗(c)p. Thus we can
guarantee system designers have a strong preference that
Cy(g | T (k)) ⊆ Cl(g).
Proof: First note that
∆W (c′)/k∗(c′) = p/d0 · α+ pe = p, and
∆W (c)
k∗(c)
=
2mc + 2mcα− (2mc − ncp)
dmcα− ncpe =
2mcα+ ncp
dmcα− ncpe .
Thus, we wish to show p < 2mcα+ncpdmcα−ncpe , or equivalentlydmcα− ncpep < 2mcα+ ncp.
Let R = dmcα−ncpe−mcα−ncp such that R ∈ [0, 1).
So we may obtain mcαp+ncp2 +Rp < 2mcα+ncp, which
may be simplified further into Rp < mcα + ncp(1 − p) +
mcα(1 − p). We may further observe that mcα + ncp(1 −
p) +mcα(1− p) ≥ α and clearly p ≥ Rp. Thus p < α =⇒
Rp < mcα+ ncp(1− p) +mcα(1− p).
Lemma 4: When k < kmax(M), a line graph is within 2p
of optimal against a malicious adversary for k < kmax(M):
W (g∗(M(k)),M(k))−W (LINE,M(k)) ≤ 2p. (34)
and it holds that
W (g∗(M(k)),M(k)) ≥ 2m(1+α)−pmin{k,m−1}. (35)
Proof: First we seek conditions on arbitrary graph g
such that it may satisfy
W (g|M(k)) > W (LINE|M(k)) (36)
for some k ∈ [0, kmax(M)). Theorem 1 and Lemma 3 give
that for q ∈ arg minc∈Ce(g) k∗(c)
k∗(q) > k (37)
must hold or (36) will not be satisfied.
We may also deduce that to satisfy (36) there must exist
some k where |Cy(g|M(k))| < |Cy(LINE|M(k))| knowing
Cy(g|M(k)) ⊆ Cl(g|M(k)), thus we can conclude the
following two conditions must hold for g to satisfy (36):
|Cl(g)| < |Cl(LINE)| = m− 1 and (38)
k > |Cl(g)|. (39)
That is, graph g has fewer lone nodes then LINE, so there
may exist a k where g will feature less ~y lone nodes, and
k must be large enough to be in this zone. Let kg be the
minimal such k to satisfy (39) on graph g.
Now we note that k∗(q) may be increased and kg may
be decreased by following a simple algorithm where all
components are destroyed and replaced with tree components
with corresponding edge counts. So we seek forest graphs
satisfying k∗(q) > kg .
On forest graphs we may easily compute kg = 2m−m−
|Ce(g)| + 1 = m − |Ce(g)| + 1 as tree components always
satisfy nc = mc + 1. We may once again optimize forest
graph g then by removing all components except q and and
producing as many copies of q as possible. However, the
process will not be feasible if mq - m, so we use mmq as
an upper bound on |Ce(g)| while maintaining a given k∗(q)
thus producing lower bound
kg := m−m/mq + 1 = m(mq − 1)/mq + 1 ≤ kg. (40)
Since (40) is independent of α, p, we take a = p = 1 to de-
duce upper bound k¯∗(q) = 2mq+1 ≥ dmqα+nqpe = k∗(q).
We now show kg ≥ k∗(q) holds for mq ∈ {2, 3, 4, ..., bm3 c}
by showing kg ≥ k¯∗(q). It follows algebraically that
kg ≥ k¯∗(q)⇔ m ≥ 2m2q/(mq − 1), (41)
and the right hand statement is always true since
2
m2q
mq − 1 ≤ 2
m2q +mq − 2
mq − 1 = 2mq + 4 ≤ m, (42)
where the inequalities follow from 2 ≤ mq ≤ m/3 and
m ≥ 12. Thus (37) never holds for graphs satisfying 2 ≤
mq ≤ m/3.
If mq = 1 (i.e., g = SPARSE), it can be shown
that W (SPARSE,M(K)) − W (LINE,M(k)) ≤ 2p. If
mq > m/3, the resulting g can have at most 2 nontrivial
components, and it can be shown that W (g,M(K)) −
W (LINE,M(k)) ≤ p.
